Appellate Court Invalidates Substituted Service Under CCP 415.20(c) at a Commercial Mail Receiving Agency

By Tony Klein, © 2022

On October 15, 2021, the California Court of Appeal (2d Appellate District (LA)) issued a ruling in Kremerman v. White 71 Cal.App.5th 358 (2021), invalidating a service based upon declarations and a proof of service that inaccurately described service at a commercial mail receiving agency (CMRA).

The problem, illuminated in the Kremerman decision, invalidated the service because, inter alia, the service did not strictly comply with the statute.

The process server retained in the case made several attempts to personally serve the defendant Angela White (aka Blac Chyna, hereinafter referred to as White) with a breach of contract and negligence lawsuit at several addresses – one where the plaintiff knew she vacated, her new address where she moved, and another at a CMRA where she received mail.

After attempting service and stakeouts at all these addresses, the process server left the summons and complaint at the CMRA and mailed a copy there.

The trial court ordered that the defendant was in default and entered a default judgment. White filed a motion claiming that she was never effectively served which the court denied. The plaintiff then levied White’s bank account and White appealed.

The appellate court reviewed the record and ultimately reversed the trial court’s denial of White’s motion to set aside the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to the trial court to vacate the entry of default and the default judgment and to set aside the garnishment order issued to execute the judgment.

The appellate court found several deficiencies with the service. The process server’s declaration erroneously referenced that he was serving an unlawful detainer action, when in fact the case was for breach of contract and negligence. The server attempted service at the White’s vacated address, her new address, and performed unsuccessful stakeout attempts at both locations, and ultimately sub-served the lawsuit at a CMRA, her mailing address without first establishing due diligence there. The process server provided a proof of service stating that the documents were left there at 11:57 PM with a “competent member of the household”, and then mailed the subserved copy to “the authorized employee at Postal Annex.”

The CMRA employee who accepted service provided a declaration that she received the documents and, within 48 hours of receipt, placed a copy in the defendant’s box, and mailed a copy to the defendant’s mailing address at the CMRA, not her actual address on file, 20 days later.

The court discussed the distinction between a void and voidable judgment and agreed with White’s assertion that the proof of service and declarations describing it were invalid and did not comply with the statutory requirements. The proof of service was deemed “invalid on its face”, based upon the court record, and no further extrinsic evidence was necessary to make that determination.  The trial court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction over the Defendant to adjudicate the action and exceeded its authority to enter the default and default judgment.

Issue #1:  The process server incorrectly described the documents being served on the diligence declaration, and attempted service at a home address known by the plaintiff already vacated by White months earlier; therefore, none of those attempts should count towards due diligence.

Issue #2:  The process server checked the incorrect box [box 5(b)(2)] on the proof of service stating service was effected at the “dwelling house or usual place of abode” of the defendant by leaving with “a competent member of the household”; whereas, the server should have instead checked the box for “usual mailing address” [box 5(b)(3)]. Also, the server mailed the documents to the CMRA employee, not to the Defendant.

Issue #3: CCP §415.20(c) has the statutory requirement that the CMRA address must be the only address reasonably known to the Plaintiff; whereas, here, the Plaintiff knew the Defendant’s current home address.

Issue #4: Because there was no diligence established prior to service at the CMRA, based upon the server’s defective due diligence declarations (see Issue #1 above), the only option for a valid service would fall under CCP §415.20(c) rather than §415.20(b); therefore, the strict language of subsection (c) has become problematic. Had the server properly documented the several due diligence attempts at the known home address of the Defendant, the Plaintiff could have possibly supported valid service under CCP §415.20(b) – notwithstanding the server’s assertion that service was made there 3 minutes before midnight.

Amendment to CCP 415.20

The recent amendment to CCP sec. 415.20 and adding subsection (c) conflated B&P Code section 17538.5(d) into a service of process statute with the phrase “in the manner described in” that section.  That B&P section is not a service of process law. It is a law that limits the liability of a CMRA when receiving service of process for the defendant.

Under B&P Code section 17538.5(d), the CMRA must:

1) make a copy and place one set of the documents in the defendant’s box within 48 hours; and

2) then, within 5 days of receipt of the service, enclose the second copy of the served documents in an envelope, put postage on it, go to a post office, stand in line, and mail it to the defendant at the last known address in the CMRA’s file; and

3) then purchase a Certificate of Mail from the post office for $1.65; and

4) then prepare an affidavit of service by mail with the Certificate of Mail attached and provide a copy to any requesting party or the court.

Then the CMRA is not liable to the defendant, and service is “deemed perfected” within 10 days after said mailing.

Under existing and recently amended CCP sec. 415.20(c), service is only valid if the CMRA does all of that. In other words, the process server is relying on a third person, the CMRA, to comply with B&P Code sec. 17538.5(d).

The defect in the service cannot be cured by the process server’s sub-service mailing to the address of the CMRA because the address for mailing under B&P Code sec. 17538.5(d) must be made by the CMRA to the last known address on file. That address is unknown to the server.  As mentioned previously, the CMRA in this case did not mail the documents to White at her address on file, but instead, to her mailbox.

Service is valid when made at the defendant’s mailing address – any mailing address other than a U.S. Post Office box – under CCP sec. 415.20(b) after making a due diligent attempt to serve.  The mailing to the defendant is complete 10 days after the date of service and mailing.

The process server “effects service by delivery and mailing, and service deemed complete 10 days after the mailing.  The CMRA “perfects” service by its mailing, and “(s)ervice of process upon the mail receiving service customer shall then be deemed perfected 10 days after the date of mailing.”

The legal dictionary defines perfected as “having completed all necessary legal steps to achieve a result, such as perfect title to property.”

Merriam-Webster defines “perfect” as follows:

1b: satisfying all requirements: ACCURATE

1e: legally valid

The use of the word “perfect” creates ambiguity in the law.  B&P Code sec 17538.5(d) is a limitation of liability statute. In this context, the CMRA is not liable when service is perfected. The “legal result” here is to specify the dates and all the legal steps the CMRA must take to limit its liability – not when service is deemed “effected”.

But when is service of process deemed “effected”? Is it ten days after the process server mails the sub-service copy, or when (or if) the CMRA mails a copy?  How is the court able to determine when the defendant is in default? This apparent ambiguity still arises when the process server establishes due diligence and subserves the CMRA under CCP sec. 415.20(b) and mails a copy to the defendant.

The phrase in CCP sec. 415.20(c) “if the only address reasonably known for the person to be served is a private mailbox obtained through a commercial mail receiving agency” allows service to be made without due diligence either when the CMRA address is the only known address or due diligence has been made at any known alternative address. The phrase “[n]otwithstanding subdivision (b)…” in CCP sec. 415.20(c) requires it.

What this appellate decision illustrates is that the declarations and proof of service must be accurately prepared to reflect the service event. This service probably could have been defended if the declarations were accurate, although the server’s mailing should have been addressed to the defendant, not the CMRA. The focus on the CMRA’s failure to comply with B&P Code sec. 17538.5, which of course is embedded and referenced in CCP 415.20(c), only piles on to the server’s improperly completed declarations.

Nevertheless, the decision addressed why the service was invalid for purpose of voiding the judgment. It did not address the issue to fix the date when service is deemed complete and will perpetuate the confusion when and if the CMRA does not strictly comply with B&P sec. 17538.5(d).

Since this is now a reported decision, it could provide an affirmative defense for defendants who are sub-served at a CMRA with or without due diligence. It could result in challenges to services made under CCP sec. 415.20(c) since it went into effect in 2018.

Special thanks to Gretchen Lichtenberger for her input

See related blog post here.


New Policy for 3-Day Notice Services?

Note: See 2/27/20 Update here:

There is a new interpretation changing the effective service date when deemed complete after a 3-day notice is subserved or posted. It may be finding its way to a court near you.

The California Judicial Council has apparently sent all California courts a new directive about extending that date by 10 days. This directive, which is morphing into policy, is posted on the Judicial Council’s website here:

This new policy is beginning to be adopted by courts in the bay area. Highlighted are the parts that add 10 days to a subserved or posted notice. The courts that are adopting this policy will not allow the unlawful detainer case to be filed unless the service is complete.

It is not uncommon for the Judicial Council to write directives for self-represented litigants in their “Self-Help” pages. They cover several legal topics. They create forms explaining procedural requirements, such as a small claims form entitled How to Serve a Business or Public Entity (which is reasonably accurate), and how to fill out a proof of service. There are several family law topics that are posted on their website.

But this explanation on how to serve a 3-day notice is flawed in so many ways.

The issue of when service is deemed complete after subserving or posting a notice has been to the appellate courts on several occasions in the past 70+ years. The issue has mainly focused on whether the mailing should be extended 5 days, similar to the extensions for mailing a notice to an opposing party in litigation under CCP sec. 1013. That issue has been repeatedly rejected for the service of a 3-day notice, noting that the 3-day notice is a pre-litigation document, the unlawful detainer action is a summary proceeding where time is of the essence, and that service must be made that strictly complies with the requirements in Unlawful Detainer Act.

It has NEVER been 10 days.  It is for service of a summons, but never a 3-day notice.

Furthermore, not only are courts following this. Pro per or pro se litigants or non-professional process servers will also be reading this.  Note, for instance, the phrase “nail and mail”. Although the description is a colloquial term, some might read it literally. Just think what a nail might do to a $10,000 door.

The law governing service on 3-day notices is found in CCP sec. 1162

CCP section 1162.  

(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), the notices required by Sections 1161 and 1161a may be served by any of the following methods:
(1) By delivering a copy to the tenant personally.
(2) If he or she is absent from his or her place of residence, and from his or her usual place of business, by leaving a copy with some person of suitable age and discretion at either place, and sending a copy through the mail addressed to the tenant at his or her place of residence.
(3) If such place of residence and business cannot be ascertained, or a person of suitable age or discretion there can not be found, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the property, and also delivering a copy to a person there residing, if such person can be found; and also sending a copy through the mail addressed to the tenant at the place where the property is situated. Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner.
(b) The notices required by Section 1161 may be served upon a commercial tenant by any of the following methods:
(1) By delivering a copy to the tenant personally.
(2) If he or she is absent from the commercial rental property, by leaving a copy with some person of suitable age and discretion at the property, and sending a copy through the mail addressed to the tenant at the address where the property is situated.
(3) If, at the time of attempted service, a person of suitable age or discretion is not found at the rental property through the exercise of reasonable diligence, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the property, and also sending a copy through the mail addressed to the tenant at the address where the property is situated. Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner.
(c) For purposes of subdivision (b), “commercial tenant” means a person or entity that hires any real property in this state that is not a dwelling unit, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1940 of the Civil Code, or a mobilehome, as defined in Section 798.3 of the Civil Code.(Amended by Stats. 2010, Ch. 144, Sec. 1. (AB 1263) Effective January 1, 2011.)
  • CCP section 1162 says that the posting may be made “by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the property” – it does not have to be on the door. It could also be posted on a locked metal gate preventing access to the door, or a window close to the entryway, or on a wooden stake, sunk into the ground, 1/4 mile from the house on a farm.  All of those are conspicuous places on the property. Also, the tape is fine, but a nail could damage the door – bad advice if read literally.  
  • The directive doesn’t mention that you must also attempt service at a known business before you can resort to subservice on a person or by posting the notice.
  • The notice does not need to be served on someone 18 or older – the statute stated that it may be served on a person of “suitable age and discretion.” If no person of “suitable age and discretion” can be found, any “resident” may be served. That could mean a 10-year-old, alone, at home from school. 
  • The mailing is to be made to the tenant at the residence, not the subject property unless it is a commercial tenant.

Finally, the directive adds a phantom 10 days to the mailing of the notice yet fails to mention that the September 1, 2019 law that changed the time calculation for service because it cannot include a weekend or holiday. (See CCP sec. 1161(2))

We’ll see how many courts adopt this. It will make for a bumpy ride for lawyers filing unlawful detainer cases in different counties. Process servers may be affected by this too.

Amendment to CCP § 415.20 will allow substituted service at a CMRA on the first attempt

An amendment to California Code of Civil Procedure [CCP] § 415.20, (effective 1/1/18) has been added allowing substituted service of a lawsuit of an individual defendant on the first and only attempt at a commercial mail receiving agency [CMRA] (e.g., The UPS Store, Postal Annex, etc.). The amendment authorizes service “in the manner described in subdivision (d) of Section 17538.5 of the Business and Professions Code [B&P Code].”

Existing law allows for substituted service of a summons on a) business, and b) an individual. Substituted service on a business may be served on the first attempt by leaving a copy with anyone apparently in charge of the business or at a mailing address. Service on an individual defendant generally requires multiple attempts – due diligence – before substituted service may be made at a home, business, or mailing address. Although due diligence is not defined by statute or case law – only what it isn’t – each venue in California defines it locally.  Generally, 3 to 4 attempts would suffice, provided the time of the attempts and days are varied.  Substituted service requires a follow-up First Class mailing to the address where the service was made whereupon service is deemed complete 10 days after the date of mailing.

The new amendment adds a new manner of service, subsection CCP § 415.20(c), when serving an individual at a CMRA.  The amendment only applies to mailing addresses at a CMRA.  It does not apply to any other mailing address, such as the former co-tenant who collects mail for the defendant who moved out, or the mother of the homeless son or daughter who collects his or her mail, or the father of a student, where a car is registered, who lives on a campus at a distant university.

The main feature of this amendment is that substituted service may be made without due diligence, and is deemed effected upon delivery, pursuant to B&P § 17538.5. Service, however, is not complete until a CMRA complies with B&P § 17538.5(d).


What is B&P § 17538.5?

B&P Code § 17538.5, governs how a CMRA must operate. It sets forth requirements and obligations.

It imparts several duties on a CMRA, and upon receipt of service, it shields them from liability to the box holder. As a condition to accept mail for a mail receiving customer, the CMRA must accept 2 forms of ID before renting the customer a box. The mail receiving customer must sign an agreement affirmatively appointing the CMRA as its agent for service.   That form, or any amendment or correction to the form, contains a home or personal address.

Because of this affirmative appointment of the CMRA as its agent for service, it could be argued that service on the CMRA is a personal service, not a substituted service.  Service under B&P Code § 17538.5(d) could be construed as a form of personal service, akin to CCP § 416.90 wherein a defendant authorizes another to accept service on their behalf.  This can only be valid if – and only if – the 3d party, here, the CMRA, fully complies with the B&P § 17538.5(d).

Under B&P Code § 17538.5(d), the CMRA is required to

  • accept any service of process for the mail receiving customer for up to 2 years after the customer terminates the agreement;
  • Within 48 hours after receiving process the CMRA must place a copy of the process in the box of the mail receiving customer (unless the agreement has been terminated);
  • Within 5 days, the CMRA must mail a copy of the served documents to the mail receiving customer to their last known home or personal address;
  • The CMRA must purchase a Certificate of Mailing  (PS Form 3817) for $1.35 which can only be obtained by standing in line and mailing the documents at a US Postal Service office;
  • If the CMRA has complied with these requirements, the CMRA must provide any involved party a declaration under penalty of perjury of the mailing and attach a copy of the Certificate of Mailing, stamped by the USPS.

Service under the new CCP § 415.20(c) is deemed effected 10 days after the CMRA mails the copy to the defendant at the last known home or personal address on the agreement form.


What does B&P § 17538.5 really do?

If the CMRA complies with the requirements in B&P § 17538.5 they are not liable to the mail receiving customer if a judgment is rendered against them for failure to receive notice of the action.  This section really isn’t a service of process statute, but describes what a CMRA must do to escape liability to the box holder/defendant.

There is no duty owed to the plaintiff or the process server for failure to comply.  The inference is that liability would only attach if a judgment was rendered against the mail receiving customer.

Cross referencing this section under new CCP § 415.20(c) elevates compliance with B&P § 17538.5, limiting liability exposure, to when and whether substituted service is deemed effective.


Why is this statute flawed?

This statute is flawed because CMRAs seldom, if at all, fully complied with these requirements. Generally, they accept the papers and place them in the mail receiving customer’s box. That is all. Many flip the server a ration of attitude and toss the papers in the trash and attempt to refuse service.  Last month I had a CMRA proprietor throw the papers back at me which hit me in the face, then land in the gutter.  There they remained as a got into my car and drove off.

Furthermore, I have heard of several instances where service on a CMRA was invalidated because the CMRA did not comply.  If there is no mailing, the court cannot determine the date that the defendant is in default.


Why will this a change in the law lead to confusion?

Because this amendment references this flawed statute, process servers will be unwittingly serving CMRAs on the first attempt, without due diligence, relying on the CMRA to comply with B&P § 17538.5(d).

Substituted service under CCP § 415.20(b) at a mailing address, and service under B&P § 17538.5 are two in-congruent manners of service which cannot be reconciled. Substituted service under CCP § 415.20(b) requires a delivery and a mailing to the defendant’s address where the service is made – in this case, the CMRA location.

Under the new law, B&P § 17538.5 requires delivery to the CMRA, and CMRA must mail to “the mail receiving customer to their last known home or personal address” listed on the agreement signed by both the CMRA and the box holder. In the context of B&P § 17538.5, that “last know home or personal address” is one known only to the CMRA – not the process server.

The server cannot cure a defect in service under CCP § 415.20(c) by mailing to the defendant at the place where the service was made, because it must be mailed by the CMRA to the defendant’s address they have on file.

Therefore, this amendment to CCP § 415.20 does not make it easier and more efficient for process servers.  It will likely induce process servers, and litigants directing their process servers, to sub-serve the mail receiving customer on the first attempt, with a futile reliance that the CMRA will follow through with their statutory obligations. It may lead to defendants filing motions to quash service, or set aside defaults, resulting in delays to commence court cases. It may expose process servers to liability and/or additional costs for re-service.


How can you properly serve the mail receiving customer at a CMRA?

A server should continue to rely on CCP § 415.20(b), existing law, by establishing (pointless) due diligence at personal service, and sub-serve the defendant on the 3d or 4th attempt, and mail a copy to that address via First Class Mail.

If the service is made without due diligence under CCP § 415.20(c), and CMRA fails to comply with B&P § 17538.5, it will not likely result in a valid service.


Holmes v. Electronic Document Processing, Inc., 966 F.Supp.2d 925 (2013)

Case No.: 12-CV-06193-LHK.

Cheryl Anatole HOLMES, Plaintiff, v. ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PROCESSING, INC. and Tanaya V. Sulcer, Defendants.

United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division.

August 15, 2013.

Attorney(s) appearing for the Case

Fred W. Schwinn, Raeon Rodrigo Roulston, Consumer Law Center, Inc., 12 South First Street, Suite 1014, San Jose, CA 95113-2418, for Plaintiff.

Steven S. Nimoy, Soltman, Levitt, Flaherty & Wattles LLP, 2535 Townsgate Road, Suite 307, Westlake Village, CA 91361, for Defendants.


LUCY H. KOH, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Cheryl Anatole Holmes (“Holmes” or “Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendants Electronic Document Processing, Inc. (“EDP”) and Tanaya V. Sulcer (“Sulcer”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”); the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, California Civil Code §§ 1788 et seq. (“RFDCPA” or “Rosenthal Act”); and California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. (“Unfair Competition Law” or “UCL”). Holmes contends that, in an attempt to collect a debt, Defendants filed a false proof of service in a state court action.

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 13 (“Mot. to Dismiss”), and Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 14 (“Mot. to Strike”). Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court found this matter appropriate for determination without oral argument. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Strike.

  2. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff Holmes allegedly incurred a consumer credit debt (“the alleged debt”) at some unknown time for personal, family, or household purposes. See Compl. ¶ 44, ECF No. 1. The debt was consigned and/or otherwise assigned to Lang, Richert & Patch, a debt collection law firm. Compl. ¶ 45.

On June 14, 2012, Lang, Richert & Patch filed a lawsuit against Holmes in the Santa Clara Superior County, Unifund CCR Partners v. Cheryl Anatole Holmes, Santa Clara County Case No. 1-12-CV-226523 (the “State Court Action”), in an attempt to collect the debt. See Compl. ¶ 46. Thereafter, Lang, Richert & Patch allegedly hired Electronic Document Processing, Inc. (“EDP”) — a California corporation engaged in the business of composing and selling forms, documents, and other media to be used for debt collection — to serve Holmes by delivering to her a copy of the State Court Summons and Complaint. See Compl. ¶¶ 10, 47. Tanaya V. Sulcer (“Sulcer”) is a process server who is or was an employee and/or agent of EDP. See Compl. ¶¶ 11, 21(b).

Holmes contends that, on or about July 18, 2012, EDP composed a false Proof of Service of Summons and filed it in the Santa Clara Superior Court in order to obtain a default judgment against her. See Compl. ¶¶ 48, 49; id. at Ex. 1. This Proof of Service of Summons represents, under penalty of perjury, that Sulcer personally served Holmes with a copy of the Summons and Complaint for the Superior Court lawsuit. See Compl. ¶¶ 48-49. However, Holmes disputes that she was served personally. Rather, on or about July 10, 2012, “Plaintiff returned home from work and found the Summons and Complaint wedged under her front door.” Compl. ¶ 54. In addition, the Proof of Service of Summons describes the person served as a female Caucasian, 50-years-old, with brown hair and brown eyes, 5 feet 8 inches tall, and weighing 165 pounds. See Compl. ¶ 54. However, Holmes is 62-years-old, with blond hair and blue eyes, and weighs 125 pounds. See id.

Holmes further alleges that EDP authorized Sulcer to use EDP’s address and telephone number on process server returns in order to shield Sulcer from service of process if she were sued. See Compl. ¶ 27. Holmes contends that EDP also intentionally withheld its own name and process server registration number from the process server returns in order to misrepresent the true nature of EDP’s services and EDP’s relationship with Sulcer. See Compl. ¶ 26.

According to Holmes, EDP and Sulcer are engaged in the “practice of `sewer service’ — i.e., failing to serve a debtor and filing a fraudulent affidavit attesting to service so that when the debtor later fails to appear in court, a default judgment can be entered against her.” Compl. ¶ 1.1 The Proof of Service of Summons in this case indicates that Defendants sold the process server return to Lang, Richert & Patch for $59.00. Compl. ¶ 53. Because EDP will pay Sulcer and other process servers only for service attempts that are reported as completed, and will pay substantially less or nothing for service that is not reported as completed, Holmes alleges that “process servers like Sulcer have a strong financial incentive to falsify process server returns.” Compl. ¶ 55. According to Holmes, “EDP knowingly promotes the use of false process server returns through its flat rate or fixed fee compensation.” Compl. ¶ 55. Holmes also alleges that “[d]ebt collection law firms and debt buyers plainly benefit from the sewer services provided by unscrupulous process servers like the Defendants in this case” because they are “able to generate hundreds of judgments by default on cases where they could never prevail on the merits.” Compl. ¶ 57. “Once default judgments are fraudulently obtained, they are sued to levy consumer’s bank accounts, garnish their wages, seize their property, damage their credit reports, and/or pressure them into unaffordable payment plans.” Id.

  1. Procedural History

Holmes filed her Complaint on December 6, 2012. ECF No. 1. On February 19, 2013, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike the Complaint. See ECF Nos. 6, 7. The following day, the case was reassigned to the undersigned judge. ECF No. 12. On February 26, 2013, Defendants amended and re-noticed their Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Complaint. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 13; Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 14. On April 12, 2013, Holmes filed her Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, see Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 18, and her Opposition to the Motion to Strike, see Opp’n to Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 19.2 On April 26, 2013, Defendants filed their Reply in support of the Motion to Dismiss, see Reply Supp. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 21, and their Reply in support of the Motion to Strike, see Reply Supp. Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 20.

  2. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an action for failure to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal citations omitted). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir.2008).

However, a court need not accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially noticeable facts, Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir.2000), and a “court may look beyond the plaintiff’s complaint to matters of public record” without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment, Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n. 1 (9th Cir.1995). Nor is a court required to “`assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.'” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir.2011) (per curiam) (quoting W. Min. Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.1981)). Mere “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir.2004); accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Furthermore, “a plaintiff may plead herself out of court” if she “plead[s] facts which establish that [s]he cannot prevail on h[er]… claim.” Weisbuch v. Cnty. of L.A., 119 F.3d 778, 783 n. 1 (9th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

  1. Motion to Strike

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits a court to “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). “[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). Motions to strike are generally disfavored and “should not be granted unless the matter to be stricken clearly could have no possible bearing on the subject of the litigation … If there is any doubt whether the portion to be stricken might bear on an issue in the litigation, the court should deny the motion.” Platte Anchor Bolt, Inc. v. IHI, Inc., 352 F.Supp.2d 1048, 1057 (N.D.Cal.2004) (internal citations omitted). “With a motion to strike, just as with a motion to dismiss, the court should view the pleading in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. “Ultimately, whether to grant a motion to strike lies within the sound discretion of the district court.” Cruz v. Bank of New York Mellon, No. 12-00846, 2012 WL 2838957, at *2 (N.D.Cal. July 10, 2012) (citing Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir.2010)).


Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss argues that: (1) Holmes fails to state a claim under the FDCPA because Defendants are entitled to the “process server exception” pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(D); and (2) Plaintiff’s claims are barred by California’s litigation privilege, pursuant to California Civil Procedure Code § 47(b). The Court will address each argument in turn.

  1. Failure to State a Claim under the FDCPA

To state a claim alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (“FDCPA”), a plaintiff must show: “(1) that [s] he is a consumer; (2) that the debt arises out of a transaction entered into for personal purposes; (3) that the defendant is a debt collector; and (4) that the defendant violated one of the provisions of the FDCPA.” Freeman v. ABC Legal Services, Inc., 827 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1071 (N.D.Cal.2011). For purposes of this motion, Defendants do not challenge the first two elements. See Mot. to Dismiss at 4. Thus, the Court will only address the third and fourth elements of Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim.

  1. Whether Defendants Are “Debt Collectors”
  2. “Debt Collector” as Defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)

Holmes asserts that Sulcer and EDP act indirectly as “debt collectors” because they regularly serve process for debt collection lawsuits. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 11, 21, 22, 25-28, 37. Specifically, Holmes alleges that, by manufacturing false Proofs of Service, EDP and Sulcer assist other debt collectors in obtaining default judgments when debtors fail to appear in court. Id. Moreover, EDP’s purported advertising and marketing of process service to debt collectors suggest that EDP targets at least some of its service of legal process to assist debt collectors. See Compl. ¶ 21. Defendants dispute that they are “debt collectors” under the FDCPA simply because “a portion of [EDP’s] [attorney] services relate to collection actions of consumer debt.” Mot. to Dismiss at 8.

Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), a “debt collector” is defined as any person whose principal purpose of business is to collect debt, or “who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Notably, the term “debt collector” is not limited to formal debt collection agencies. See, e.g., Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292, 115 S.Ct. 1489, 131 L.Ed.2d 395 (1995) (including within the definition of a “debt collector” a lawyer who regularly, through litigation, tries to enforce consumer debts). In fact, Congress intended the scope of the Act “to cover all third persons who regularly collect debts for others.” S.Rep. No. 95-382, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1697-98 (stating that “[t]he requirement that debt collection be done `regularly’ … exclude[s] a person who collects debt for another in an isolated instance, but … include[s] those who collect [debts] for others in the regular course of business.”). Therefore, the language and the legislative history of the FDCPA suggest that an entity qualifies as a “debt collector” if it regularly performs debt collection services, regardless of what percentage of its services relate to debt collection. See S.Rep. No. 95-382, at 3; see also Romine v. Diversified Collection Servs., Inc., 155 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir.1998) (“Had Congress intended to limit the Act to licensed or registered collection agencies, it would have confined the statutory language to businesses for which debt collection is the `principal purpose.'”). As Holmes alleges that Defendants regularly perform debt collection services, the Court finds that Holmes has sufficiently alleged that Defendants’ actions are those covered by the term “debt collector,” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

  1. Process Server Exemption

Nevertheless, the FDCPA does carve out certain exceptions to the term “debt collector,” which Defendants argue renders them exempt from the allegations in this case. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A)-(F). Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(D), for instance, the term “debt collector” does not apply to “any person while serving or attempting to serve legal process on any other person in connection with the judicial enforcement of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(D). As Sulcer was attempting to serve legal process on Holmes in connection with the judicial enforcement of a debt, Defendants maintain that they fall squarely within this “process server” exemption. See Mot. to Dismiss at 2; Reply Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 2.

Holmes disputes that Defendants are exempt from the purview of the FDCPA and contends that Defendants’ alleged filing of a false process server return brings Defendants outside of the role of a process server. As Judge Edward Chen noted in Freeman v. ABC Legal Services, Inc., 827 F.Supp.2d 1065 (N.D.Cal.2011) — a similar FDCPA case in which the plaintiff alleged that a legal services corporation filed a false proof of service in superior court in order to obtain a default judgment against plaintiff — “when someone who would otherwise qualify for the exemption `goes beyond being merely a messenger in serving process and engages in prohibited abusive or harassing activities to force an individual to repay a debt,’ the exemption no longer applies and the process server is subject to FDCPA liability.” Id. at 1073 (quoting Flamm v. Sarner & Assoc. P.C., No. 02-4302, 2002 WL 31618443, at *5 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 6, 2002)).

Importantly, 15 U.S.C. § 1692d, which is entitled “Harassment or Abuse,” proscribes debt collectors from “engag[ing] in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. “Without limiting the general application of the foregoing,” Section 1692d lists examples of conduct that is considered unlawful. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(1)-(6). For example, a debt collector may not attempt to collect a debt by threatening or using violence to harm a person, using obscene or profane language as a form of abuse, engaging in public shaming, or harassing people with continuous telephone calls. Id.

While Defendants acknowledge that the process server exemption does not apply when someone engages in prohibited abusive or harassing activities as enumerated in 15 U.S.C. § 1692d, Defendants urge this Court to adopt a narrow interpretation of the “abusive and harassing” behavior which forfeits the process server exemption. See Mot. to Dismiss at 5. In particular, Defendants claim that alleged sewer service does not forfeit the exemption because sewer service is not specifically listed in 15 U.S.C. § 1692d as one of the proscribed harassing, oppressive, or abusive behaviors.

The Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ argument that “the filing of a false proof of service cannot be equated with the type of abusive and oppressive conduct specifically identified by the statute.” Mot. at 6. Importantly, the list of proscribed abusive and harassing activities in Section 1692d is non-exhaustive. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (listing six harassing and abusive behaviors that violate the statute “[w]ithout limiting the general application” of the statute’s prohibition on harassing, oppressive, or abusive conduct); see also Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 660 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir.2011) (“The Act includes a non-exhaustive list of examples of proscribed conduct.”). Moreover, courts have specifically held that engaging in sewer service can forfeit the process server exemption. See, e.g., Freeman, 827 F.Supp.2d at 1074 (holding that plaintiff

“sufficiently alleged that Defendants engaged in the practice of `sewer service’ so as to forfeit the process server exemption.”). Similarly, in Spiegel v. Judicial Atty. Servs., No. 09-7163, 2011 WL 382809, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 1, 2011), a plaintiff filed suit against Judicial Attorney Services, Inc. and an individual process server, claiming that defendants violated the FDCPA’s prohibition on “unfair, harassing, and deceptive” debt collection practices by falsely claiming that they effected personal service on plaintiff in connection with a debt collection lawsuit. The Northern District of Illinois denied defendants’ motion to dismiss based on defendants’ argument that they were exempt from the FDCPA by virtue of the process server exemption because, “if [plaintiff’s] allegations were true, the defendants’ actions would have taken them beyond their role as process servers and rendered them ineligible for the exception.” Id.

Even if sewer service constitutes the type of “abusive and harassing activity” that forfeits the process server exemption, Defendants still dispute that one instance of sewer service suffices. See Mot. to Dismiss at 6. However, Defendants provide no legal support for their “suggestion” that “[a] single isolated incident does not equal the `practice of sewer service’ such that it should obliviate [sic] the process server exemption under the FDCPA.” Id. Moreover, courts have indicated that “the execution of one false proof of service” could “be enough to forfeit the process server exemption.” Freeman, 827 F.Supp.2d at 1074; see also Spiegel, 2011 WL 382809, at *1 (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss based on defendants’ argument that they were exempt from the FDCPA by virtue of the process server exemption even though plaintiff alleged only one act of “sewer service”). Defendants have not provided any cases suggesting the contrary.

In light of Freeman and Spiegel, the Court finds that Holmes has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim that Defendants are not covered by the process server exemption. The Complaint alleges that Defendants engaged in at least one act of sewer service because they “failed to serve court process entrusted to them and instead provide[d] a perjured Proof of Service of Summons.” Compl. ¶ 4. Rather than serving Holmes personally — as Defendants claimed in the Proof of Service — Defendants merely wedged the Summons and Complaint under Holmes’s front door. Further, Holmes alleges that the Proof of Service of Summons describes the person served as a female Caucasian, 50-years-old, with brown hair and brown eyes, 5 feet 8 inches tall, and weighing 165 pounds. See Compl. ¶ 54. However, Holmes is 62-years-old, with blond hair and blue eyes, and weighs 125 pounds. See id. Moreover, Holmes asserts that the Defendants included only limited information on the process server return in an effort shield Defendants from liability if sued. See Compl. ¶ 26. As it may be possible for even one instance of sewer service to forfeit the process server exemption, the Court finds that Holmes has sufficiently alleged that Defendants are “debt collectors” under the FDCPA who are ineligible for the process server exception because of their engagement in “sewer service.” See Freeman, 827 F.Supp.2d at 1074.3

Thus, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint based on the contention they are not “debt collectors” pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) of the FDCPA is DENIED.

  1. Whether Defendants Violated any Provisions of the FDCPA

The second issue for the Court to resolve is whether Holmes has alleged conduct that violates any provisions of the FDCPA. Holmes claims that, by filing a false Proof of Service and withholding EDP’s name and process server registration number from the Proof of Service, Defendants violated Sections 1692d, 1692e, 1692e(2), 1692e(10) and 1692f of the FDCPA. See Compl. ¶ 69.

As noted above, Section 1692d prohibits “any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. In addition, Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Further, Section 1692f prohibits the use of “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.

Holmes asserts that Defendants violated Sections 1692d, 1692e, 1692e(2), 1692e(10) and 1692f of the FDCPA by virtue of their engagement in sewer service. Specifically, Holmes asserts that Defendants violated the FDCPA “by making false and misleading representations, and engaging in unfair and abusive practices” which “include, but are not limited to” the following:

(1) manufacturing and selling a fraudulent Proof of Service of Summons that falsely stated that Plaintiff was personally served with a Summons and Complaint when in fact Plaintiff was not;

(2) manufacturing and selling fraudulent, deceptive, and misleading statements and documents which are used in the collection of consumer debts;

(3) knowingly and intentionally withholding their true name and process server registration numbers from process server returns in violation of California Business and Professions Code § 22356.5(a) with the intent to deceive, misrepresent the true nature of the services being provided, and to conceal and obscure Defendants’ joint responsibility for service of process irregularities; and

(4) aiding, abetting and ratifying the fraud, perjury, breach of official duty and other wrongful acts committed by the other Defendants in this case.

See Compl. ¶ 69.

Despite these contentions, Defendants submit that Holmes has failed to sufficiently allege violations of the FDCPA. In addition to the arguments already raised by Defendants as to why they believe that their actions should not constitute “abusive and harassing” conduct as prohibited by 15 U.S.C. § 1692d, see supra Part III.A.1.b, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim must fail because Defendants have presented a prima facie case of valid service, see Reply Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 5. As the same factual allegations of “sewer service”

[966 F.Supp.2d 935]

discussed above form the basis for Plaintiff’s allegations of FDCPA violations, the Court finds that Holmes has adequately alleged violations of the FDCPA on this basis. See also Freeman, 827 F.Supp.2d at 1075-76 (finding that allegations of sewer service sufficiently stated a claim under FDCPA Sections 1692d, 1692e, and 1692f).4 Thus, the Court now addresses Defendants’ second argument regarding the presumption of valid service.

The Ninth Circuit has held that “a signed return of service constitutes prima facie evidence of valid service which can be overcome only by strong and convincing evidence.” SEC v. Internet Solutions for Bus., Inc., 509 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 2007). Because Defendants filed a signed Proof of Service, see Compl., Ex. 1, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s mere declaration that she was not served without an additional showing of evidence is insufficient to refute the presumption of validity. See Reply to Mot. to Dismiss at 5-6.

However, a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of the alleged claims, rather than whether a plaintiff’s evidence establishes a likelihood of prevailing at trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Freeman, 827 F.Supp.2d at 1069 (“The question presented by a motion to dismiss is not whether the plaintiff will prevail in the action, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of the claim.”). Moreover, courts have held that the presumption of validity of a proof of service may be overcome at trial through the presentation of contradictory evidence. See Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522, 526 (2d Cir.1996). As a result, the Court is not persuaded that the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to present “strong and convincing evidence” that overcomes the presumption of validity.

Because Holmes has sufficiently alleged that Defendants are “debt collectors” and that Defendants have violated provisions of the FDCPA, Holmes has set forth a prima facie case for violation of the FDCPA. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on this basis.

  1. The Rosenthal Act and California’s Litigation Privilege

Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim under the Rosenthal Act is barred by California’s litigation privilege, California Civil Code § 47(b). Mot. to Dismiss at 10. Section 47(b) of the California Civil Code provides in relevant part that, “[a] privileged publication or broadcast is one made … [i]n any … judicial proceeding….” Cal. Civ.Code § 47(b). Defendants argue that the alleged filing of a false proof of service constitutes a “privileged communication” made in a judicial proceeding, and thus falls within the scope of California’s litigation privilege.

The California Supreme Court has held that the litigation privilege “applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.” Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1057, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 516, 128 P.3d 713 (2006). “The purposes of section 47, subdivision (b), are to afford litigants and witnesses free access to courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative actions, to encourage open channels of communication and zealous advocacy, to promote complete and truthful testimony, to give finality to judgments, and to avoid unending litigation.” Komarova v. Nat’l Credit Acceptance, Inc., 175 Cal.App.4th 324, 336, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 (2009) (quoting Rusheen, 37 Cal.4th at 1063, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 516, 128 P.3d 713) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To effectuate these purposes, the litigation privilege is absolute and applies regardless of malice.” Id. Consequently, in Rusheen v. Cohen, the California Supreme Court denied an abuse of process claim and held that, “where the gravamen of the complaint is a privileged communication (i.e., allegedly perjured declarations of service) the privilege extends to necessarily related acts (i.e., act of levying).” 37 Cal.4th at 1062, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 516, 128 P.3d 713.

However, courts have recognized exceptions to the litigation privilege under statutes that: “(1) are `more specific’ than the privilege, and (2) would be `significantly or wholly inoperable’ if the privilege applied.” Komarova, 175 Cal.App.4th at 337, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 (quoting Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1246, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 398, 163 P.3d 89 (2007)). Until recently, California state courts had not discussed whether the litigation privilege applies to actions brought under the RFDCPA, and federal district courts were divided on the issue. See id. (citing each line of conflicting district court cases).

To support Defendants’ assertion that the litigation privilege applies here, Defendants cite the minority line of district court cases which stand for the proposition that a claim brought under the RFDCPA is barred by California’s litigation privilege. See Reply Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 4-5 (citing Lopez Reyes v. Kenosian & Miele, LLP, 525 F.Supp.2d 1158 (N.D.Cal.2007), which held that the RFDCPA claim was not exempt from California’s litigation privilege because the claim was based exclusively on communications made within judicial proceedings), see also id. (citing Nickoloff v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 511 F.Supp.2d 1043 (C.D.Cal.2007), and Taylor v. Quall, 458 F.Supp.2d 1065 (C.D.Cal.2006), for the same general proposition). Defendants also rely heavily on Rusheen v. Cohen for the proposition that the litigation privilege applies to actions taken in collecting a judgment. See Mot. to Dismiss at 11. Yet, while Rusheen discussed the litigation privilege generally, it did not involve an RFDCPA claim. Thus, Rusheen is distinguishable from the instant action on that basis. See Rusheen, 37 Cal.4th 1048, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 516, 128 P.3d 713.

However, the California Court of Appeal in Komarova v. Nat’l Credit Acceptance, Inc., 175 Cal.App.4th 324, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 (2009), clarified the issue by adopting the majority viewpoint that the litigation privilege does not bar RFDCPA claims. Id. at 337-338, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 880; see also Santos v. LVNV Funding, LLC, No. 11-02683, 2012 WL 216398, at *2-3 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (citing Komarova to support the finding that the litigation privilege does not apply to RFDCPA claims); see also Blackburn v. ABC Legal Servs., Inc., No. 11-01298, 2011 WL 8609453, at *2-3 (N.D.Cal. June 16, 2011) (“[T]he Court follows Komarova and holds that the litigation privilege does not apply to bar Plaintiff’s claim under the Rosenthal Act.”). Specifically, the Komarova Court held “that the [litigation] privilege cannot be used to shield violations of the [RFDCPA]” when the two statutes conflict. Komarova, 175 Cal.App.4th at 337-338, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 880. In so doing, the Court of Appeal in Komarova reasoned that applying the privilege “would effectively vitiate the Rosenthal Act and render the protections it affords meaningless.” Id. at 338, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 880. Therefore, the Court of Appeal “applie[d] the familiar principle of statutory construction that, in cases of irreconcilable conflict, the specific statute prevails over the general one.” Id. (quoting Oie v. N. Star Capital Acquisitions, L.L.C., 486 F.Supp.2d 1089, 1100 (C.D.Cal.2006)). Here, the litigation privilege similarly conflicts with the RFDCPA as applied in this action, because the privilege would completely shield Defendants from liability for the improper collection of debt.

Nevertheless, Defendants maintain that Komarova is not controlling in the instant action. See Reply Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 5. Defendants argue that neither Komarova nor any “of the cases cited by Plaintiff where the court denied application of the litigation privilege to state law claims involved cases where the entirety of the alleged conduct took place within the context of litigation such as the filing of a false proof of service.” Reply Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 5.

Notably, “[t] he California Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue of whether the litigation privilege bars Rosenthal Act claims founded on unfair debt collection practices that occur during the course of litigation.” Huy Thanh Vo v. Nelson & Kennard, 2013 WL 1091207, at *14 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 15, 2013). Nevertheless, the Court finds significant that since the issuance of Komarova — the sole published decision by a California appellate court to address the litigation privilege in the context of the RFDCPA — not “a single federal court has found Rosenthal Act claims to be barred by the litigation privilege.” Id. at *14. In fact, district courts have generally interpreted Komarova as holding broadly that “[t] he California litigation privilege … does not apply to RFDCPA violations.” Santos, No. 11-2683, 2012 WL 216398, at *3; see Blackburn, No. 11-01298, 2011 WL 8609453, at *2 (“The California Court of Appeal … held that the litigation privilege does not apply to bar claims under the Rosenthal Act.”). The Court also finds the reasoning of Komarova to be persuasive in light of the fact that the RFDCPA is a remedial statute, and thus “should be interpreted broadly in order to effectuate its purpose.” Komarova, 175 Cal.App.4th at 340, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see generally People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court, 14 Cal.4th 294, 313, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 855, 926 P.2d 1042 (1996) (“civil statutes for the protection of the public are, generally, broadly construed in favor of that protective purpose”); see also Welker v. Law Office of Horwitz, 626 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1072 (S.D.Cal.2009) (“[T]he Court finds ample authority that the [California litigation] privilege should not be applied to claims arising under the FDCPA or California’s Rosenthal Act.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s RFDCPA claim as barred by the litigation privilege.5 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

  1. Motion to Strike

Next, Defendants move to strike various portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint as immaterial or scandalous. First, Defendants move to strike as immaterial Holmes’s allegations regarding the filing of a false proof of service because Defendants contend that the allegations are barred by the litigation privilege. Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 7, at 3. As discussed above, the Court rejects this argument. See Komarova, 175 Cal.App.4th at 337-38, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 880. The Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Strike allegations that Defendants filed a false proof of service.

Second, Defendants move to strike as scandalous and immaterial Holmes’s allegations that Defendants engaged in sewer service and other improper business practices. See Mot. to Strike at 5. Scandalous material has been defined as allegations that cast a “cruelly derogatory light” on a party or person. See Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 791 F.Supp.2d 968, 977 (D.Nev.2011); In re, Inc. Sec. Litig., 114 F.Supp.2d 955, 965 (C.D.Cal.2000). Immaterial matter is “that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) (quoting 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1382, at 706-07 (1990)). The Court finds that Holmes’s allegations do not rise to the level of casting Defendants in a “cruelly derogatory light” and are therefore not “scandalous.” The Court further finds that Defendants have not demonstrated that the allegations of sewer service or improper business practices are entirely unrelated to the claims or that these allegations prejudice Defendants. See id. at 1528; see also Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 217 F.Supp.2d 1028, 1033 (C.D.Cal.2002) (“Given their disfavored status, courts often require a showing of prejudice by the moving party before granting [a motion to strike].”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Wailua Assocs. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 183 F.R.D. 550, 553-54 (D.Haw.1998) (“Matter will not be stricken from a pleading unless it is clear that it can have no possible bearing upon the subject matter of the litigation; if there is any doubt as to whether under any contingency the matter may raise an issue, the motion may be denied ….”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For example, Holmes’s allegations of improper business practices could serve to establish that EDP aided, abetted, and ratified Sulcer’s actions or that Defendants have forfeited the process server exemption. Accordingly, the Court finds that the allegations of sewer service and improper business practices are not immaterial.

Given that motions to strike are generally disfavored and the challenged portions of the Complaint are relevant to the claims, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Strike. See Cruz, No. 12-CV-00846, 2012 WL 2838957, at *2.


For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Strike.





  1. As explained in Richardson v. Alliance Tire & Rubber Co., 158 F.R.D. 475 (D.Kan. 1994), the term “sewer service” originated in jurisdictions in which process could be served by professional process servers rather than public officials, and derived from those “process servers [who] once followed a practice of disposing of process given to them to serve (e.g., by throwing it down a sewer) and then falsely returning that they had duly served it.” Id. at 480 n. 5 (quoting 1 Robert C. Casad, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions § 3.01[7][d] (2nd ed.1991)).
  2. On February 28, 2013, the parties filed a joint stipulation to amend the briefing schedule, which the Court hereby grants. See Stipulation, ECF No. 15.
  3. Although Defendants contend that “[e]xtending the provisions of the FDCPA to process servers … would have a chilling effect on process servers and grind the already slow wheels of justice to a halt, or at least a trickle,” Mot. at 2, the Court doubts that such a catastrophic effect will indeed transpire. Notably, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k, “[a] debt collector may not be held liable in any action … if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). Thus, while it may ultimately prove true that Sulcer merely made a mistake when serving Holmes and did not indeed engage in “sewer service,” such a determination will turn on evidence that must be evaluated at a different stage of this case. See Fox v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 15 F.3d 1507, 1514 (9th Cir.1994) (“The language of Section 1692k(c) indicates that the bona fide error exception is an affirmative defense, for which [defendant] has the burden of proof at trial.”).
  4. Defendants also raise for the first time in their Reply in support of the Motion to Dismiss that “[n]either the FDCPA nor the RFDCPA directly regulate service of process,” and “[t]he RFDCPA does not apply to Defendants.” see Reply Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 7-8. This Court “need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir.2007); see also Gold v. Wolpert, 876 F.2d 1327, 1331 n. 6 (7th Cir.1989) (“It is well settled that new arguments cannot be made for the first time in reply. This goes for new facts too.”). Thus, the Court declines to consider these arguments.
  5. In addition, it is well established that “[t]he California litigation privilege … does not apply to FDCPA claims.” Santos, Case No. 11-02683, 2012 WL 216398 (citing Welker, 626 F.Supp.2d at 1072). Moreover, the litigation privilege also conflicts with and would nullify the UCL. “[B]ecause Plaintiff’s [UCL] claim is premised on violations of the Rosenthal Act… and on violations of the FDCPA, a federal claim to which California’s litigation privilege is inapplicable, Plaintiff’s [UCL] claim is not barred by the litigation privilege either.” Blackburn, 2011 WL 8609453, at *2-3 (following Komarova).

Officer of the Court

I have been flushing out my bloated email account and came across the following written response to a process server in 2011 who had put the phrase “Officer of the Court” on his business card and asked for my opinion about it.

The opinion then seems to be still relevant, but I have since recently spoken to another process server who gave me another perspective about it. More to come – maybe.

I welcome your thoughts.

    I have done a little research on this topic recently, and our Criminal Law Speaker at our PSI dinner in Hayward Friday evening addressed it because, coincidentally, it came up.

An “officer of the court” (according to a Wikipedia entry) is described as follows:

“The generic term officer of the court (not to be confused with court officers) applies to all those who, in some degree in function of their professional or similar qualifications, have a legal part—and hence legal and deontological obligations—in the complex functioning of the judicial system as a whole, in order to forge justice out of the application of the law and the simultaneous pursuit of the legitimate interests of all parties and the general good of society.

They can be divided into the following functional groups; in most case various synonyms and parallels exist as well as a plethora of operational variations, depending on the jurisdiction and the changes in relevant legislation …”

    There is not a clear definition, having checked 2 law dictionaries, “Words and Phrases” and “Corpus Juris Secundum” in the law library.

    Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as follows:  “A person who is charged with upholding the law and administering justice.”

    Obvious and most common examples of an “officer of the court” would be a judge, clerk, bailiff, sheriff, peace officer, and since about the early 1900s, attorneys.  It could also be a court interpreter, receiver, and court stenographer, all of whom are in some manner are appointed by a court or participate in or serve to facilitate the administration of justice in the courts.

   What I have concluded is that an officer of the court is one who is acting at the direction of or under the authority of the court.

    Process servers in some states derive their authority from the court.  Arizona process servers, for instance, are “certified” by the AZ Supreme Court, and therefore, are identified as an “officer of the court” by statute (ARS §11-445(I)). .  There are others. Oklahoma licensed process servers are referred to as an “officer of the court” (ORCP § 12-158.1(C)(1)). Illinois refers to those process servers upon special appointment.

    On the other hand, some states specially forbid use of the term.  The New Jersey Professional Process Servers Association has promulgated a Canon of Ethics prohibiting their members from using the term, and a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal case ruled that a Texas process server was not an officer of the court for purposes of removal (Herron v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 57 (1996))  That case cited as precedent a U.S. Supreme Court decision:

“… Our decision is guided by Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 76 S.Ct. 456, 100 L.Ed. 474 (1956), holding that an attorney was not a court “officer” within the ordinary meaning of that term:

Certainly nothing that was said in Ex Parte Garland[, 4 Wall 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 (1866) ] or in any other case decided by this court places attorneys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court clerks or judges. Unlike these officials a lawyer is engaged in a private profession, important though it be to our system of justice. In general he makes his own decisions, follows his own best judgment, collects his own fees and runs his own business. The word “officer” as it has always been applied to lawyers conveys quite a different meaning from the word “officer” as applied to people serving as officers within the conventional meaning of that term. We see no reason why the category of “officers” subject to summary jurisdiction of a court under Sec. 401(2) should be expanded beyond the group of persons who serve as conventional court officers and are regularly treated as such in the laws.


    What is emerging for me is that the term “officer of the court” is one whose authority to act is derived from the court, as an officer thereof – similar to (but not the same as) a “Court Officer”, or a “Public Officer”.  a California Registered Process Server does not derive that authority from the court by appointment or certification.  Our authority is a statutory creation, setting forth a registration requirement with the county clerk, a bonding requirement, and a fingerprinting requirement.  Therefore, I do not consider a California Registered Process Server an officer of the court.

   We may serve process, and do so in an analogous manner as those other officers of the court (sheriffs), but that does not make us an officer of the court.

   That being said, our speaker at our dinner disagrees, and based on the Black’s Law Dictionary definition I read during our discussion, he concluded that we were officers of the court when serving process as an extension of the court, and serving process, and would have no problem referring to a process server that way.



Subpoenas for HIIPA Records

A recent public post by a lawyer writing for ACH Media website entitled You Must Respond Carefully When You Are Served With a Subpoena caught my attention when he made the following assertion:

A court subpoena carries more weight than one from an attorney.

This did not seem legally correct at the time.  Self-initiating discovery in civil cases has been the trend in both federal and state courts starting in the mid-1980s, wherein lawyers, as officers of the court, were permitted by statute to issue subpoenas to witnesses for depositions and trials, without going to the courthouse to do so. Regardless of who or how it was issued, any objection to the subpoena would find the follow the same route through the court in the form of a motion to quash service or to modify the scope of the subpoena, or even a protective order.

After re-reading the article, I then realized that the it was written by a lawyer with an intended audience of risk managers or the people in health information management at hospitals.  The tenor and topic of the article was a good, solid directive to those dealing with the release of patient’s healthcare records in response to subpoenas and search warrants under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIIPA).

The author provided no authority for his assertion about court issued vs. attorney issued subpoenas. He alluded to the lack of a notification requirement under HIIPA that would also require a patient’s written consent or a court order to release healthcare records.

Upon a little research, this characterization and distinction between a court and attorney issued subpoena is found in 45 CFR 164.512(e), wherein this notification is required under HIIPA.

I am assuming that is where it came from. I have not found any other authority why a court issued or attorney issued subpoena would be any more or less valid and enforceable.

Civil discovery laws are state-specific. Some states have not enacted a statutory construct for providing a patient notice when their records are being subpoenaed.

California, and I assume other states, have procedures that provide such sufficient notice.  California did it almost 10 years before HIIPA became law when they enacted the consumer notice requirement for serving subpoenas that demand production of an individual’s personal records.  (See CCP sec. 1985.3, et seq.) Because of this notification provision, it was already HIIPA compliant.

So, in that context, the author didn’t explain the reasoning for that statement. It was factually correct, but not completely correct. At least not in California.


Opening a Levy File with the Sheriff Requirement Changes in 2017

Writ of Execution-pg 11California AB 2211 was signed into law by the governor which will allow a registered process server “cause to be delivered” a letter, fees, and a writ to open a levy file with the sheriff.  The amendment removes the requirement that a registered process server open the file. The law becomes effective on January 1, 2017.

It does not change the law requiring that a registered process server to be the one serving the actual attachment or levy.

This will hopefully relieve process servers from waiting in line for 2 hours in Los Angeles just to open the levy file.  Although inferred, the amendment did not unequivocally address the closing of the file by filing the proofs of service within 5 court days after commencing the levy.

What that will do is free up time of the RPS and allow a messenger or in-house court runner to open the file instead.  I wonder how that might work, given the problems I have fixed at the counter when I have opened levy files, saving a return trip. I also wonder if this might result in more levies being served by non-registered process servers.

The bill also re-worded, and made a stronger statement about recovering costs for the registered process server’s fee for services of the writ.

The bill had no opposition.

The law, as amended, is posted here.

Gated Community Access for Service of Process Expanded

California SB 1431 has been signed by the governor amending CCP § 415.21, effective January 1, 2017.Gated Community Guard

It would require an investigator who is employed by an office of the Attorney General, a county counsel, a city attorney, a district attorney, or a public defender, upon the display of proper identification, to be granted access to a gated community for the sole purpose of performing lawful service of process or service of a subpoena.

The full text of the bill is posted here.

We posted Blog comments last September when an amendment to this law removed the requirement that the server identify the name of the defendant or witness to be served.

This law was initially passed in the 1993 as a response to the holding in a Court of Appeal decision which validated a substituted service on a security guard at a gated community.  See Bein v. Brechtel-Jochim Group, Inc., 6 Cal.App.4th 1387, 8 Cal.Rptr. 351 (1992).

New York Traverse Hearings and Process Servers

A recent blog post by Robert J. Nahoum, entitled What is a Traverse Hearing in a Debt Collection Case? he describes what happens during a traverse hearing under New York law. California refers to this analogous procedure as a motion to quash service.

What is also interesting is a summary of what records NY process servers must keep to record their attempts and services, and how onerous it is now to be a process server there.  A NYC process server must maintain the following, including, I am told, a GPS capture of the attempts and services for 7 years in sequential electronic format, which is subject to audit:

(a) the title of the action or a reasonable abbreviation thereof;

(b) the name of the person served, if known;

(c) the date and approximate time service was effected;

(d) the address where service was effected;

(e) the nature of the papers served;

(f) the court in which the action has been commenced;

(g) the index number of the action, if known;

(h) if service is effectuated [by posting], a description of the color of the door to which the summons is affixed;

(i) the process serving agency from whom the process served was received, if any;

(j) type of service effected whether personal, substituted or conspicuous;

(k) if service is effected [personally or by delivery to another,] a description, including, but not limited to sex, color of skin, hair color, approximate age, height and weight and other identifying features;

(l) if service is effected [by posting and mailing], the record shall also include the dates, addresses and time of attempted service pursuant to subdivision one, two or three of such section;

(m) if the process server files an affidavit of service with the court, his record shall include the date of such filing.”

If a traverse hearing is initiated, the plaintiff carries the burden of proof that the service was effected properly.

Several years ago California added Evidence Code sec. 647 which gave a proof of service signed by a registered process server rebuttable presumption status, shifting the burden of proving evidence of the service away from the plaintiff, requiring the defendant to show that they were not properly served.

The court of appeal reaffirmed the validity of that presumption in Palm Properties Investments, LLC v. Yadegar, 194 Cal.App.4th 1419 (2011). [Summary of decision]

Access to Gated Community Law Change – CCP § 415.21

In 2015, the law for service of a defendant or witness at a gated community changed.  A process server no longer needs to identify the person to be served.

This is a welcome change, given that policies at gated communities restrict access to servers, and frustrate service.

Here is the change:

Amendment to CCP § 415.21

CCP § 415.21 Access to Gated Community to Serve Process or Subpoena
(a) Notwithstanding any other law, any person shall be granted access to a gated
community for a reasonable period of time for the sole purpose of performing
lawful service of process or service of a subpoena, upon identifying to the guard
the person or persons to be served, and upon displaying a current driver’s license
or other identification, and one of the following:
(1) A badge or other confirmation that the individual is acting in his or her
capacity as a representative of a county sheriff or marshal.
(2) Evidence of current registration as a process server pursuant to Chapter 16
(commencing with Section 22350) of Division 8 of the Business and Professions
Code or of licensure as a private investigator pursuant to Chapter 11.3
(commencing with Section 7512) of Division 3 of the Business and Professions
(b) This section shall only apply to a gated community that is staffed at the time
service of process is attempted by a guard or other security personnel assigned to
control access to the community.

See post discussing an amendment to this law, effective in 2017.

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